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martedì, 13 maggio 2008
PROGETTO RUSSIA

Chi vuole capire davvero qualcosa di Russia, vada in edicola.

Sommario

PARTE I CHE FARA' LA RUSSIA

Vitalij TRETJAKOV- Progetto Russia: che cosa vogliono Putin e Medvedev
Dmitrij SABOV- Chi è Dmitrij Medvedev? Una vita ‘normale’ al suono dei Deep Purple
Sergej JASTRZEMBSKIJ- ‘Siamo troppo grandi e troppo russi per entrare in Europa e nella Nato’
Tichon SEVKUNOV- La lezione di Bisanzio (presentazione di Adriano ROCCUCCI)
Adriano ROCCUCCI - Stare al confine
Vitalij AVERJANOV- Perchè non possiamo dirci occidentali
Boris NEMCOV- ‘Nè democrazia nè impero’
Maurizio MASSARI - A che serve la Russia?

PARTE II LE SPINE DI MEDVEDEV (E DI PUTIN)

Viktor I. PEREVEDENCEV- I russi, una specie in via di estinzione
Zanna ZAJONCKOVSKAJA- Ci salveranno gli immigrati?
Valerij TISKOV- Il nostro futuro è nella lingua
Ivan RUBANOV- I quattro pilastri della strategia energetica
Ruslan S. GRINBERG- Una coppia inedita per modernizzare la Russia
Viktor MJASNIKOV- Più welfare che strategia. Medvedev il giurista di fronte ai suoi soldati

PARTE III IL MONDO SECONDO LA RUSSIA

Fédor LUKJANOV- La Nato che vorremmo
Ferdinando SALLEO- Nato-Usa-Russia: accordi dissonanti
Mauro DE BONIS- Alla conquista del Polo Nord
Vladimir PORTJAKOV- Cina, amore e odio
Nicolò CARNIMEO e Marisa INGROSSO- Mediterraneo russo
Piero SINATTI - L’Ucraina in bilico tra Russia e Occidente
Sergej MARKEDONOV- I salafiti avanzano nel Caucaso
Aleksej MALASENKO- Quanto è russa l’Asia centrale?
Paolo SOLDINI - L’eredità avvelenata della Stasi. Documenti storici dell’Urss - Alle origini di Helsinki
(presentazione di Adriano ROCCUCCI)

Sul sito di LIMES: SPECIALE PROGETTO RUSSIA 2.0

Postato da: Fandorin a 20:39 | link | commenti |
politica, russia

martedì, 06 maggio 2008
THE LITVINENKO FILE...

 

"Alexander Litvinenko died on 23 November 2006, after a mysterious and painful illness. The cause was identified, less than two hours before his death, by scientists at the British government's Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston. They found that he had been poisoned, with the radioactive isotope polonium-210. The diagnosis came too late for an antidote to be administered. But the victim, who had been a hale and hearty 44-year-old only four weeks before, had time to authorise a thunderous deathbed statement in which he accused Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, of ordering his murder. Litvinenko's very public suffering, complete with ghoulish photographs and daily bulletins, was chronicled (with rather too much relish for my taste) by Alex Goldfarb, a former Russian human rights activist and friend of Litvinenko. As it happened, his macabre one-man show outside London's University College Hospital coincided with the release of the latest James Bond film, Casino Royale. Everything contrived to raise the fearsome cold-war stereotypes of Russia that lurk fractionally below the genteel surface of British opinion. Russia was suddenly back in vogue, in the most convincingly negative way.

From there, it was but an elegant diplomatic one-step to the authorised British version of the "Litvinenko affair". During his almost six years in London, this former Soviet and Russian intelligence officer had become an increasingly outspoken foe of President Putin. His dramatic deathbed "J'accuse" served posthumously as indictment and proof of Kremlin complicity. The polonium clinched it. Only Russia, it was said, had the capacity to produce polonium-210. The lab, even the date of production, could easily be identified. And if anyone asked why, of all substances available to potential assassins, the choice had fallen on polonium, the answer came back pat: it was in the confident expectation that the cause of death would never be diagnosed. In the unlikely event that the British public still harboured the odd doubt, there were only a few weeks to wait for a fall guy. The presumed assassin hove into view right on cue: Andrei Lugovoi, another former KGB agent and security consultant, had left a radioactive trail all over aircraft, offices and hotels. In late May, 2007 – by which time he was safely back in Russia – the British submitted a formal request for his extradition. That the Russians turned it down flat only completed the familiar picture. Russia was guilty; guilty as hell.

Now, maybe the simple and obvious explanation is the correct one. Maybe Putin, a former KGB man – "once a chekist, always a chekist", as the saying goes (Lenin's Cheka was the forerunner of the KGB) – had personally issued the order to punish Litvinenko as the traitor that, in his eyes, he undoubtedly was. If you think it a stretch to believe that Putin himself commissioned the dirty deed, how about a splinter group of resentful erstwhile KGB colleagues? Nor need the motive stop there. Litvinenko fell ill the day after he was granted British citizenship. Might his killer(s) not have had a supplementary purpose: to use this very public, lingering death to scare Britain's most outspoken Russian exiles into leaving, or at least keeping their anti-Putin thoughts quiet? The explanation is neat, self-contained and entirely plausible. But is it the truth, or anything like the truth? You do not have to be a Le Carré to see espionage and exile as fertile fields for deception. The most straightforward story may turn out to contain hidden depths or be built on shifting sand. And there were early signs – not least in the speed with which the official British version became set in diplomatic aspic – that there might have been more to the affair than met the eye. The first people to articulate doubts, characteristically, were the myriad conspiracists of the blogosphere – which was useful to peddlers of the official view in that it helped to discredit more substantial doubters. Over the months, however, alternative versions have grown in consistency and authority to the point where they now deserve a serious hearing.

Contributions have been made by individuals who patently know what they are talking about – whether it is the science of radiation, the byways of espionage or the incestuous milieu of exiled Russians. Locked out of the mainstream media as irresponsible fantasists, they have turned to the alternative media, or to blogs. The most recent and, to my mind, most persuasive, piece of revisionism managed, just, to cross the bridge to the mainstream. A long and detailed article by the veteran US investigative journalist, Edward Jay Epstein, it was printed in The New York Sun (19 March 2008) and has been avidly read and critiqued on the internet. So far as I am aware, this article has not been published in Britain, but that has not prevented it being dismissed as inconsequential.

(QUI L'ARTICOLO DI EPSTEIN)

It was referred to contemptuously by Litvinenko's widow, Marina, in an article that appeared recently (27 March) under her name in The Times. She tossed it off as a piece printed "in a third-rate New York newspaper" written by a "fringe American journalist". The thrust of her article was a call for a public inquest into her husband's death. But the timing of its publication, soon after the appearance of Epstein's investigative tour de force, suggests that a pre-emptive trashing of his thesis was at least part of the reason why she put pen to paper when she did. I have a great deal of time for Marina Litvinenko. She has suffered her extraordinary, and in many ways tragic, predicament with immense dignity and forbearance. Her romance with Alexander, whom she describes as the love of her life, had lasted 16 years, and was ended brutally. She comes across as utterly honest and sincere. She is all of a piece and she does not adapt either her manner or her story according to the audience. In one way, however, she may not be the most useful witness. What she actually knew about her husband's work, either in Russia or after they fled to Britain, appears not to be a great deal. As someone who found love relatively late in life, she says, she saw it as her role to make her husband's complicated life easier in whatever way she could. A former dance teacher, petite and elegant, she professes to have taken no part, nor even exercised any curiosity about, what his work in exile entailed.

She does say, though, that he was often homesick, adapted poorly to life abroad and spent much time watching Russian television news and videos of old Russian films. She hints, too, that he had a difficult side. As she tells it, he could be dogmatic, tending to see the world in black and white. In Russia, she says – and again, this would fit his character – his work was on the policing side of the intelligence services, and focused on investigating the organised crime that burgeoned in the 1990s.He also served in the border region adjacent to Chechnya – that was where he had grown up – and helped recruit informers from among anti-Russian Chechen fighters. Marina says he was not trained in espionage, nor did he ever work as a secret agent – by which I think she means he was never a cold-war-style spy. She saw him, rather, as a painstaking and dedicated seeker after truth. She also presents him as a stickler for the law, and cites his adamant refusal to let her drive the family car before she had passed her British driving test, even though she had a Russian licence. He would do nothing, she said, absolutely nothing, that might put the family on the wrong side of the law of the land that had given them refuge.

Yet Edward Jay Epstein is not someone whose journalism should be dismissed lightly. He is, to be sure, something of a professional sceptic, but that does not make him wrong. He has in the past exposed stories published in The New York Times as having been essentially dictated by the political establishment. How right he was about the cosy relationship between that venerable newspaper and the Administration was evident from its obsequious coverage of Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction – a humungous error that eventually produced an abject apology. No one in the journalistic world would deny that Epstein's investigative pedigree is serious or that he has an ear for "spin" and disinformation. In compiling his article for The New York Sun – and the more exhaustive material that appears on his website – he interviewed dozens of people and delved into the scientific aspects of the case. In what was a considerable coup, he also went to Moscow, where he was allowed to see the extradition papers submitted by the British for their chief suspect, Andrei Lugovoi. These are documents that no one in Britain has seen, not even Litvinenko's widow.

Marina, not unreasonably, resents this, and regards Epstein's expedition as a Russian propaganda ploy. She says he was "invited" to Moscow on the understanding that his article would be supportive of the Russian view. The Russians may well have been kindly disposed towards Epstein as a sceptic of the conventional wisdom. But he tells the story of his Moscow trip rather differently. He says that it took much persistence to get to Russia, and then to gain access to the papers. As for being invited, most foreigners need an invitation from a Russian institution to obtain a visa, so Marina's point may be technically true without implying anything about Epstein's objectivity. What he says struck him above all about the papers was the flimsiness of the British case and the lack of even a post-mortem report. In that respect, Marina may have a point about his pro-Russian sympathies. But it is the theory he eventually gravitates towards to which Marina Litvinenko so takes exception.

This is that Alexander poisoned himself while handling radioactive material. Epstein posits that Litvinenko was poisoned by accident – the post mortem, he says, would have determined whether he ingested the polonium-210 or inhaled it. Part of his thesis is that the isotope had been smuggled to London not to murder someone, but as part of an illegal nuclear transaction. Marina's refusal to entertain such a theory is understandable. As she says, "I have to protect my husband's good name." The husband she knew was faithful, honest and law-abiding to a fault. The very notion that he would be involved in illicit, not to mention highly dangerous, dealings seems to her alien in the extreme.It is partly to quash such speculation that she is pressing, through her solicitor – the respected human rights lawyer, Louise Christian – for a full inquest into her husband's death. If she cannot have justice, she says, she deserves at least the truth.

The British authorities do not seem to be exactly rushing to hold an inquest, even though the last agony of Litvinenko, a Russian exile who had just become a British national, must surely qualify as one of the most shocking deaths to have occurred in the capital for years. The delay can be explained by a technicality: if a prosecution is in prospect, then an inquest is not held until afterwards, because all relevant questions might be cleared up by a trial. On her client's behalf, Christian is categorical about what makes an inquest imperative. There was, she says, a "massive breach of security". A lethal radioactive substance was brought into the country "for a terrorist purpose.... Not only Litvinenko was contaminated, but other individuals as well". It is vital, she says, that lessons are learnt – and for that it needs to be established where the polonium was produced, how it came into the country, and how it was subsequently spread around. It is up to the St Pancras coroner, as this is the jurisdiction that University College Hospital comes under, whether and when an inquest is held. And while coroners officially enjoy substantial independence, there are points where political pressure can be exerted. So the more time that elapses without an inquest being scheduled into one of London's most high-profile deaths, the more the delay looks suspicious. After all, if the case is as cut and dried as the British government has consistently made out, what has anyone possibly to lose? The answer, if the persistent digging of informed sceptics, such as Epstein, has come anywhere near the truth, could be an awful lot.

Consider the questions that remain open almost 18 months after Litvinenko's death. There are a great many of them; some overlap, but they are roughly divisible into five clusters.

The most obvious relate to the polonium-210 that was identified as the cause of his illness just before he died. Then there is the role of Andrei Lugovoi. The Crown Prosecution Service says it has enough evidence to charge with murder, but the only third party to have seen the papers, Edward Epstein, says the case is extremely thin. Third, there are the mysterious activities of Litvinenko himself. The fourth cluster of questions concerns the part, if any, played by the British secret services, and, last, the role of the exiled Russian oligarch, the enigmatic Boris Berezovsky.

For the sake of clarity, I will deal with these groups of questions one by one.

Polonium

The accepted wisdom has been that polonium-210 is produced only in Russia and that the particular laboratory, its jurisdiction and so the identity of the organisation that gave the crucial order, would be easily identified. Since then, no names have been named, even though the "right" answers should surely bolster the British contention that Russia, or the former KGB, was behind the killing.Unofficially, the Avangard plant at Sarov, east of Moscow, is thought the likely source. So why have British officials not named it? One explanation is that the police are holding back such details for fear of jeopardising the accused's chance of a fair trial. Given that a trial now seems such a remote prospect, though, it is hard to see why this information is still not in the public domain. Another explanation might be that the answers do not fit the favoured theory.

What is certain is that Russia is not the only producer of polonium-210. Epstein (among others) reports that, while Russia produces it for export to the United States (!), any country with a nuclear reactor not subject to IAEA inspection can produce it – they include China, Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea. So the consolation that there is only Russia to worry about is flat wrong. But there is another, and perhaps bigger, problem. Scientists who know anything about polonium-210 find it hard to believe that anyone would choose it as a murder weapon against one individual, even if the purpose was to evade detection. For a start, it is extremely expensive. But it also fits much more comfortably into another scenario: that of nuclear smuggling. It seems far more likely that the polonium tracked in London was part of some sort of deal – a deal that, for whatever reason, went disastrously wrong.

Demand for polonium-210 on the illegal international market is as a key element in detonating a nuclear explosion. This is why it commands such a fantastically high price – hundreds of thousands, if not the many millions, of dollars mentioned by some. Money, and even nuclear terrorism, thus emerge as plausible motives to compete with the theory of a Putin-inspired political assassination. Either would entail embarrassment for the British authorities, for it would suggest that illegal nuclear trafficking was going on under their very noses, with all the attendant dangers to the population. It also raises the question of border security. The small matter of how such a lethal substance got into the country pertains, of course, regardless of its intended purpose. So far, however, this crucial question has been successfully muffled by the horror of the presumed crime and the blanket allegation that "the Russians did it".

Lugovoi

The second cluster of questions relates to Andrei Lugovoi, charged in Britain with Litvinenko's murder. A former KGB agent with his own security company, he was singled out from the radiation trail left on several planes and at various locations in London. This trail was also used to determine that the poisoning took place at the Pine Bar at the Millennium Hotel in Mayfair and that the polonium was disguised in a cup of tea. Despite the familiarity of this version, practically every element of it raises doubts. The sequence of meetings and flights that established Lugovoi as the original carrier of the polonium has been convincingly challenged. The British – Epstein and others have suggested – have omitted details of flights and contaminated sites that would contradict the thesis that the polonium originated with Lugovoi.

Counter-theories make Litvinenko himself the centre, and source, of the contamination. They track the radiation trail first from London, rather than Russia. They also note that one of the properties reported (by The Independent, 26 January 2007) as contaminated – an office building at 25 Grosvenor Street in Mayfair, does not figure in the official trail. It is an office building believed to be owned by Boris Berezovsky. Some of the most persistent doubts about the fingering of Lugovoi centre on the meeting in the Pine Bar. Lugovoi – of whose account more later – sees this encounter as a set-up designed to frame him. He says that Litvinenko dropped in only briefly and that no tea was ordered or drunk. Lugovoi also notes that no CCTV footage has ever been produced to prove the Pine Bar/contaminated tea story, even though the place bristled with cameras. The closest thing to evidence was a story that appeared out of the blue in the British press a full seven months later, identifying the waiter who supposedly served the tea. This has all the hallmarks of an effort to shore up a version teetering on the brink of collapse.

If there was any deliberate poisoning – by tea, or any other substance – the most plausible venue appears to be a room at the same hotel where the two met earlier that same day (1 November). But the two had met on two previous occasions as well: two weeks before at another hotel, and in August at Litvinenko's home. There is nothing, however, to prove conclusively who poisoned whom – nor to disprove the theory that Litvinenko might somehow have been poisoned by mistake. Lugovoi has, of course, strenuously denied that he was the assassin – and, of course, he would, wouldn't he? I would argue, though, that what he had to say when he gave his first Moscow press conference (31 May 2007), and repeated at a later appearance (29 August 2007) held largely for the British media, does not necessarily deserve to be dismissed as fabrication. On both occasions, Lugovoi appears cocky – but this does not prove he is lying. What also impresses is his spontaneity and the consistency of the detail under questioning. His account of approaches from MI6 and meetings with named agents at a New Cavendish Street address – have a ring of truth. It is worth noting, too, that none of the details has been denied by any branch of the British authorities. The have preferred the time-honoured tactic of ridicule.

As Lugovoi tells it, a long, calculated effort was made by MI6 to recruit him – an effort he eventually rebuffed. He said they wanted him to pass on intelligence and dish the dirt on Putin. He also says that after Litvinenko died, he "cooperated with the Crown Prosecutor's office and answered every question. I also answered all the questions that the Scotland Yard investigators asked me." There has been no denial of this from either the CPS or the Met. Would a murderer be so cooperative? Lugovoi's central defence, however, is lack of motive. "Just think of it," he says. "They have found a Russian James Bond, who has access to nuclear plants and poisons a friend in cold blood, and, in so doing, poisons himself, his friends, his children and his wife.... Then, as a result, he loses his business and clients. The main question is what for? Where is the motive for my crime?" For the record, Lugovoi's lack of motive is something that also worries Litvinenko's widow. What we have here, then, is a chief suspect with no motive, who may not have been the source of the polonium, and who says he was set up by MI6. If this last point is true, then there may be other reasons why he has been accused – and why the British might not want him in a London witness box.

This could explain something else that has long been a mystery to me. I always found it difficult to believe that the British ever seriously expected to obtain Lugovoi's extradition, especially against a Russian constitutional provision that expressly protects Russian nationals against being delivered to a foreign country. I never understood, either, why the British were so furious about Russia's non-compliance that almost the first act of David Miliband as Foreign Secretary was to up the ante by expelling four Russian diplomats. British official fury becomes more much more comprehensible, however, if Lugovoi's real crime in their eyes was not to have killed Litvinenko, but to have fled the clutches of British intelligence – with, perhaps, information valuable enough to buy his safety back home. Fast-tracked into the Russian parliament last December, he now enjoys immunity not only from extradition, but from prosecution in his own country. In sum, there are plenty of reasons not to accept the accusations against Andrei Lugovoi at face value.

Litvinenko

The authorised British version is that Alexander Litvinenko was a political refugee who paid the ultimate price for his vocal opposition to Putin. The more that emerges about him, however, the more complicated his life seems to have been. Mystery surrounds precisely how Litvinenko occupied himself when he was not at home watching old videos. He and his family received a house and an income from Boris Berezovsky's charitable foundation, but it is not clear what his paymaster might have asked of him in return. According to the book written jointly by his widow and Alex Goldfarb – the Russian émigré who issued the bulletins on Litvinenko's fatal illness – he helped conduct due diligence investigations into Russian companies on the part of would-be foreign investors. He is also known to have travelled frequently, mainly to Georgia and other countries formerly in the Soviet Union. At the same time, much of the information he had been privy to as an investigator in the commercial division of Russian intelligence in the 1990s would have been out of date, so his usefulness to any investor would have been limited – as it would have been to a foreign intelligence service. It was apparently the low grade of information he had to offer that brought a rejection from his first choice of asylum – the United States.

There has been speculation that towards the end he had money worries, precipitated perhaps by a desire to break with Berezovsky. Others say this is disinformation. What is not in dispute is that he had known Andrei Lugovoi in the 1990s and that they shared a connection with Boris Berezovsky. They had not been in touch, however, for almost 10 years, when Litvinenko suddenly approached Lugovoi from London, and suggested meeting up. Lugovoi says they then did some – unidentified – projects together, though he suggests that Litvinenko did little more than sit in on his meetings, in the hope, perhaps, of drumming up some business for himself. No evidence has emerged that either was involved in nuclear smuggling – or, if they were, on whose behalf. One person who definitely was involved in such murky dealings, however, is Mario Scaramella, the Italian businessman and academic, whom Litvinenko met on 1 November at the Itsu restaurant in Piccadilly.It is also worth noting that one of the few instances of nuclear smuggling to have come to light in recent years (of uranium) concerned a Russian man caught in Georgia in 2007 as part of an FBI "sting" operation. Which introduces another dimension.

Nuclear smuggling has been much trumpeted as a global peril since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but very few cases have become public, even though Western governments would surely have an interest in demonstrating that the threat was real and being successfully addressed. In fact, I know of no case that has been reported that was not linked to a "sting" operation – staged by Western intelligence agencies to find out the extent of nuclear smuggling going on.A celebrated case uncovered in Germany in 1997 led to Russian accusations that, in their zeal to mount "sting operations", Western intelligence agents were creating an artificial market in illicit nuclear materials. Such "stings", they complained, amounted to "provocations". It is worth bearing this criticism in mind.

MI6

So is it fanciful to suggest that British intelligence might have had a role in the Litvinenko affair? And if so, what might it have been? It has been confidently reported that, at the time of his death, Litvinenko was receiving a retainer from MI6. For obvious reasons, This will never be confirmed, although irregular payments to exiles for particular pieces of information are routinely made. A retainer, though, would suggest more systematic cooperation. Lonely in London, Litvinenko also joined the circle of exiles that gathered around Oleg Gordievsky, the celebrated Russian double agent who defected to Britain back in 1985. Gordievsky has pronounced on the case at several key junctures. Immediately after Litvinenko's death, he mentioned the meeting between Litvinenko and Lugovoi in a room at the Millennium Hotel that preceded their encounter in the hotel's Pine Bar.

This is where he suggested that Litvinenko really drank poisoned tea. He also mentioned the presence of a third man, called Vladislav or similar – as another possible assassin. Some of this may be disinformation – after all, "once a chekist, always a chekist" – but some of it may not be. Lugovoi, as another former KGB man, also has credibility problems. But it is not only his account of approaches from MI6 that rings true. He has also described a meeting with Litvinenko at the offices of the Erinys security company in Mayfair (25 Grosvenor Street), which he understood to be part of Berezovsky's empire. He observed that the company seemed to be peppered with former British intelligence agents – which suggests an improbable, but not impossible, crossover between the activities of Berezovsky and those of MI6. It might also require a reassessment of Berezovsky's activities in Britain.

It is not at all clear what relations MI6 had with Litvinenko, Lugovoi or Berezovsky, but you do not have to rely on Lugovoi's self-interested testimony to suspect that it was involved with all three. The current head of MI6, John Scarlett, emerges as a linchpin. He is believed to have recruited both Gordievsky and Litvinenko. He, or his people, may also have played a part in trying to recruit Lugovoi. Gordievsky receives a relatively generous government pension. In addition, he was made a Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George (CMG) in the Queen's honours list last year – in a nice touch, it was the same award as that received by the fictional James Bond. He also appears from time to time to be called upon to sing for his supper – as two years ago when he told the BBC that the story of British agents in Moscow being caught using fake rocks as a dead-letterbox was "ridiculous". Marina Litvinenko says she knew of no contacts between her husband and British intelligence. But she did talk to me about the haven that he found in Gordievsky's circle. Perhaps Gordievsky was the link. It seems safe to say that Litvinenko had a relationship with MI6, which could be seen as providing a motive for Russia – or rival Russian exiles – to eliminate him. But it could also be seen as a hint of desperation: perhaps he could find no other line of paying business. Whatever the truth, MI6 probably knows more about what happened to Litvinenko, and why, than might be concluded from its complete non-appearance in the authorised British version of his death.

Berezovsky

If the shadowy hand of MI6 can be detected in the Litvinenko affair, then so can that of Boris Berezovsky. The Russian exile, multi-millionaire property magnate, and perpetual thorn in Putin's side, was a constant presence behind the scenes. It was he who sponsored Litvinenko's entry to Britain – out of gratitude, it is said, for Litvinenko's refusal, in the late Nineties, to act on orders to kill him. He appears to have been Litvinenko's main source of employment in Britain, and his charity continues to support his widow. Berezovsky also had links to Lugovoi. Back in Russia, he had employed Lugovoi to organise his security, and Lugovoi's company was, until recently at least, reported to have the contract for protecting Berezovsky's daughter. In the last week of Litvinenko's life, it was also Berezovsky's money that bought the publicity campaign, so expertly fronted by Alex Goldfarb. Thus the view that the British public had of Litvinenko's illness and death was essentially dictated by Berezovsky. Until the very end, neither the hospital, nor the British authorities, nor the Russian embassy contributed anything at all. Berezovsky, through Goldfarb and the PR company, Bell Pottinger, had the field entirely to himself.

Some have asked whether so comprehensive a PR effort might not have been intended as a diversion – to disguise, say, a catastrophic accident to Berezovsky's employee and recast it as a Kremlin-ordered assassination. That cannot be excluded. More likely, though, it is possible that Berezovsky genuinely believed Litvinenko to have been targeted by the Kremlin – as a proxy, perhaps, for himself. As well as perhaps feeling guilty, Berezovsky doubtless saw another opportunity to pursue his campaign against Putin. And if, as it appears, his first instinct was to suspect poisoning with thallium, the assumption of Kremlin involvement would have made perfect sense. The discovery that the poison was not thallium, but polonium-210, however – a substance that would be intended for mass, rather than individual, annihilation – suggests that the context was not political vendetta, but illicit nuclear trading. The careless handling of radioactive material then becomes by far the most likely explanation for Litvinenko's death.

That the polonium might also have been tracked as part of an attempted security services "sting" would also explain why British officials have stuck so rigidly to their version. Why, after all, would they choose to pick a quarrel with the Kremlin, rather than present Litvinenko as the accidental victim of Russian émigré nuclear trafficking – unless there was something in the latter explanation they needed to hide? And what implications do these five clusters of questions have for Anglo-Russian relations? Aside from her natural desire to clear the cloud of suspicion that is increasingly gathering over her husband's activities, Alexander Litvinenko's widow, Marina, may have another reason to press her call for an inquest now. As Russia prepares to inaugurate a new president, Dmitry Medvedev, she hopes that the Kremlin's line might soften. In fact, any softening so far is to be discerned on the British side. We have not heard any furious public statements about Russia's iniquities for a while. It was announced recently that a new ambassador had been appointed to take over from Sir Anthony Brenton, who had angered the Kremlin by consorting with opposition figures.

The slanging match over the British Council has dropped out of the news; discussions on the visa regime are to be unfrozen, and even the one-time attack-dog, David Miliband, has spoken of the need for dialogue with Russia. The decks, it seems, are being cleared for a new start under a new president, even if the old leader, Vladimir Putin, will initially be directing the production from the wings. Unfortunately, a victim of the new rapprochement could be the truth – the real truth – about what happened to Alexander Litvinenko. Sad to say, there may be those in Britain who are even more interested than the new overlord of the Kremlin in seeing this divisive case consigned to oblivion" (Mary Dejevsky, The Indipendent)

Postato da: Fandorin a 15:15 | link | commenti |
russia, gran bretagna

mercoledì, 30 aprile 2008
IL FATTORE A

"Mentre Mosca si prepara in pompa magna all’insediamento di Dmitry Medvedev al Cremlino e a quello successivo di Vladimir Putin alla Casa Bianca, in Georgia si va con una certa tensione verso le elezioni parlamentari di fine maggio. I rapporti tra i due paesi sono disturbati in questi giorni dal fattore A.

A come Abcasia, la repubblica facente parte de jure del territorio georgiano, de facto indipendente dall’inizio degli anni Novanta. La questione è abbastanza complessa, con la Russia che mantiene dal 1992 una presenza militare nella regione con funzioni di peace keeping e gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella disputa. A Tbilisi il capo di stato Mikhail Saakashvili, sostenuto dagli Usa, ha fatto dell’integrità territoriale un perno della politica di vicinato e ha sempre accusato  Mosca di fomentare il separatismo di Sukhumi, dove il presidente Sergei Bagapsh, contando sull’appoggio russo, non ha invece mai fatto mistero di voler tornare sotto l’ombrello del Cremlino.I problemi sono aumentati con l’indipendenza del Kosovo, riconosciuta dagli Usa e da diversi Stati europei, ma con molti paesi, la Russia in primo luogo, contrari. Mosca non ha interesse ad accelerare nel Caucaso la creazione di mini repubbliche indipendenti: il disgelo dei conflitti regionali dall’Ossetia all’Alto Karabakh, dalla Cecenia ad altre repubbliche facenti parte della Federazione Russa, potrebbe innescare una disgregazione difficilmente controllabile in una zona geostrategicamente importante. Ma è ormai palese l’obiettivo dell’Abcasia di raggiungere la piena autonomia appellandosi anche alla comunità internazionale, dalle Nazioni Unite all’Unione Europa, sostenendo come l’esempio del Kosovo costituisca un precedente per il riconoscimento della propria indipendenza. Naturalmente da Sukhumi l’appello è partito anche verso Mosca: all’inizio di questa settimana il ministro degli Esteri Sergei Shamba ha dichiarato che l’Abcasia sarebbe pronta a garantire gli interessi russi nella regione dietro il riconoscimento di un protettorato militare e di una aperta cooperazione economica.

Qualche giorno fa Putin ha spiegato a Saakashvili che l’intensificazione dei rapporti e gli aiuti russi verso l’Abcasia e l’Ossetia meridionale “si differenziano in linea di principio dalla decisione di alcuni paesi di riconoscere l’indipendenza del Kosovo dichiarata unilateralmente”. Come dire: la Georgia non si deve preoccupare, non abbiamo nessun piano di annessione. Sarà, ma tra aerei spia abbattuti e accuse di aggressioni vere o presunte, la situazione nel Caucaso si sta aprendo nemmeno troppo lentamente verso scenari forse imprevedibili. Ultimo atto del duello tra Mosca e Tbilsi è la dichiarazione del Ministero della Difesa russo che martedi ha preannunciato “adeguate e dure risposte” ad eventuali tentativi georgiani di risolvere il caso abcaso con la forza. Secondo la Russia la Georgia avrebbe accresciuto il proprio contingente militare nella valle di Kodori, zona contesa dove dal 2006 Tbilisi ha ripreso il controllo, denominandola Alta Abcasia, e ha insediato un nuovo governo, non riconosciuto dal presidente Bagapsh, a Chkhalta. Stando al comunicato ufficiale di Mosca “il rafforzamento delle truppe georgiane nelle vicinanze delle zone di conflitto, le minacce di utilizzo della forza militare e le ripetute provocazioni delle autorità georgiane impediscono le realizzazione dei compiti di peace keeping del contingente militare russo, costringono di fatto le forze di pace ad assumere funzioni differenti da quelle previste e ad aumentare la presenza per la garanzia della propria sicurezza e il mantenimento della pace nella regione”. Se da un parte il Cremlino mostra i muscoli e dice di voler difendere i propri concittadini in Abcasia (la maggior parte di essi ha il passaporto russo), da Tbisli arriva la notizia che la Georgia vuole bloccare i colloqui bilaterali per l’accesso della Russia nel Wto fino a che Mosca non sospenderà gli aiuti alle repubbliche separatiste. E la tensione sale.

Quello che è successo nei Balcani con il Kosovo ha dato il via allo scioglimento dei frozen conflicts con conseguenze incerte. Se fino a poco tempo fa la contrapposizione tra Russia e Usa e i loro alleati ha determinato lo stallo, ora la comunità internazionale guidata da Washington e Bruxelles ha messo in moto un pericoloso processo in cui è evidente l’utilizzo di doppi standard. A Mosca dicono oggi di non voler ascoltare le richieste di indipendenza da Suhkumi e Tskhinvali (anche per il fatto che questa situazione in questo momento fa comodo), ma come ha affermato recentemente Vadim Gustov, presidente della Commissione Csi nel Consiglio della Federazione “oggi non riconosciamo Abcasia e Ossetia del sud, ma la Russia per loro è un amico fedele e un vicino affidabile. Non sono solo parole, seguiranno i fatti”. Domani, insomma, si vedrà". (Limes)

Altri: Rian, Rferl, MoscowTimes, Eurasianet, RussiaProfile

Postato da: Fandorin a 17:10 | link | commenti (1) |
politica, russia, georgia

lunedì, 28 aprile 2008
PRODI VERSO GAZPROM?

"A Russian daily said Monday that Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller could offer Romano Prodi, who steps down as Italy's premier in early May, a top post in South Stream AG, a European gas pipeline project.

South Stream, a joint project between Russia's monopoly Gazprom and Italian oil and gas giant ENI, is expected to pump 30 billion cu m of Central Asian gas to Europe annually from 2012, at an estimated cost of $14 billion. Kommersant citing a government source said: "Analysts believe that Gazprom will do exactly as they did with Nord Stream and former Germany chancellor Gerhard Schroeder who heads the shareholders' committee," the post is roughly equivalent to board chairman. A Gazprom publication confirmed that Miller is due to meet with Prodi during a business trip to Italy on Monday". (RIA NOVOSTI)

L'articolo di Kommersant:

"Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller meets in Rome today with Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi to deliberate on the South Stream project that provides for laying a gas pipeline from Russia to Italy worth $14 billion. The sources say Miller may urge Prodi to take over Swiss-incorporated South Stream AG. According to analysts, Gazprom is following the scenario tested on Nord Stream, where German ex-chancellor Gerhard Schroeder chairs the holders’ board.

It emerged that Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller goes to Rome April 28 to meet with Italy’s Prime Minister Romano Prodi, who steps down in early May. The visit was confirmed by Gazprom, and the sources say that its purpose is to propose to Prodi to head the South Stream project, which Gazprom implements 50/50 with Italian Eni. Alexei Miller and Eni CEO Paolo Scaroni inked in the Kremlin November 22, 2007 a supplement agreement to the understanding memorandum of June 23, 2007, specifying the Swiss incorporation for South Stream AG. Eni and Gazprom will own the venture pari passu, but the share of Italian company may narrow if any other parties join the project, Scaroni said at that time. South Stream is projected to pump 30 billion cu meters starting from 2013. Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia have already sealed intention memoranda to join South Stream. Miller is expected to deliberate on all range of questions in Rome, starting from the asset swap with Eni and Enel to details of the progress in project implementation".

UPDATE:  Prodi dice no

Postato da: Fandorin a 10:33 | link | commenti |
italia, russia

venerdì, 25 aprile 2008
BERLUSCONI E IL RUSKY ZAR

Di Ennio Remondino:

"Руски Цар, se lo scrivi in caratteri latini diventa Ruski Car, lo leggi Ruschi Zar e lo traduci nello Zar Russo. Ruski Zar è il caffè della Belgrado di un'altra epoca che resiste, all'angolo tra la pedonale più avvenente al mondo, Knez Mihailova, e Trg Republika, la piazza di tutti i risorgimenti politici serbi condannati inesorabilmente a fallire. Ruski Zar occupa l'intero piano terra di un maestoso palazzo asburgico di fine ‘800, con un interno di tavoli, abatjour e poltroncine che di quell'epoca vogliono riprodurre stile e toni. Camerieri in perfetta divisa rossa da cosacchi, armati di palmare per la contabilità elettronica, e alle pareti la sfilata di tutti gli Zar di tutte le Russie. Quelli finiti bene e quelli finiti male, Zarine imbalsamate in abiti di corte, principini infanti in posa da bella statuina e mai diventati principi, ritratti ad olio di un certo pregio e riproduzioni fotografiche seppiate di una San Pietroburgo scomparsa con gli ultimi Romanoff. A completare la galleria, sulla parete che domina il piano rialzato dove c'è il ristorante, la foto a colori dello Руски Цар oggi imperante, Vladimir Putin.

Il panslavismo di Vojslav Kostunica, l'attuale premier serbo, probabilmente è una scoperta anche per lui. Più una reazione “contro” che un'autentica pulsione culturale degli slavi del sud. In tutta la vecchia Jugoslavia, i sentimenti panslavi sono stati sempre abbastanza tiepidi. Sicuramente qualche vicinanza in più nel campo della cultura e della comune tradizione ortodossa rispetto all'ideologia e al marxismo dei tempi sovietici. Comunisti atipici questi jugoslavi, quando ancora lo erano. Molto meno vicini a Mosca dell'Italia del comunismo PCI, quando Stalin era ancora imperante o appena sepolto. Lo slavismo partigiano del titoismo è stato sentimento identitario talmente forte da supplire per decenni all'assenza di una definizione nazionale precisa e condivisa. Con la caduta del muro, del comunismo e della posizione di rendita strategica jugoslava, da queste parti è arrivata la rincorsa all'identità, salvo fare un po' di confusione tra nazione ed etnia. Esattamente ciò che sta avvenendo, per la legge del contrappasso, oggi in Kosovo.

Potremmo anche dire che, con 200 anni di ritardo sull'Europa della rivoluzione francese, gli slavi del sud e coinquilini balcanici più o meno amati, si sono trovati a passare dalla forma degli imperi (sia ottomano, asburgico o socialista che sia stato), alla interpretazione post-socialista dello Stato-Nazione. Se Tito fu più lungimirante di Luigi Longo o Armando Cossutta nei confronti dello stalinismo, occorre ammettere che Milosevic non fu certamente un illuminista ed il risultato s'è visto. Grazie a Milosevic, assieme a Tudjman, Izetbegovic o Rugova, nei Balcani è iniziato il percorso turbolento verso la catastrofe dello Stato-francobollo di cui il Kosovo albanese è la sublimazione. Da questa parte dell'Europa geografica, nella lista dei responsabili, andrebbero aggiunti anche altri nomi, europei dell'Unione e transatlantici. Resta il fatto che la Serbia e non soltanto lei si trovano oggi alle prese con lo Stato non pienamente Stato che s'è imposto nella sua “provincia meridionale”. Uno Stato che c'è e non c'è. Pre o post Westfalia, ho sentito filosofeggiare in ambienti storico-accademici, a misurare la forza della Sovranità Nazionale che dal lontano 1648 governa i rapporti internazionali. Letta oggi, quella Sovranità nazionale come valore assoluto o ormai relativo, somiglia molto alla nostra barzelletta sui carabinieri, quella sulle “frecce” delle auto, che funzionano “ora si, ora no”. Più o meno come il pre o post Westfalia di Stati Uniti o Russia che sulla sovranità nazionale di Serbia o di Cecania sono ora pre, ora post Westfalia, a seconda della loro convenienza.

Il problema della Serbia è di avere un memoria storica recente sempre e solo piena di pre o post che le appaiono sempre e comunque contro. Più che un ritrovato amore per la madre-matrigna Russia, nella Serbia di oggi è trasparente un bel giramento di scatole, collettivo, nei confronti dell'occidente e soprattutto dell'Unione europea. Un'Europa definita da esponenti del governo serbo “cameriere zelante di strategie planetarie di importazione atlantica”. Persino più stupida e sostanzialmente arrogante del padrone statunitense che nei Balcani ha imposto la sua strategia. Giudizi severi a botta Kosovo ancora calda, quelli che raccogli per le strade di Belgrado e ai tavolini ricercati del Ruski Zar. Botta calda e strumentalità politica interna assieme, probabilmente, là dove lo scontro tra il Presidente filo europeo Boris Tadic e il premier conservatore Vojslav Kostunica passa anche attraverso i labili confini tra la Pannonia danubiana e la prima steppa russa.

Tra il Danubio e lo Dniepr correrà in realtà un fiume di petrolio. Il gigante energetico russo Gazprom compra dalla Serbia il controllo della sua vecchia industria petrolifera di Stato a prezzo stracciato, mettendo sul piatto della trattativa la possibilità per i serbi di controllare qualche rubinetto petrolifero destinato all'Europa ricca e poco amica. L'accordo per il passaggio sul territorio serbo del nuovo gasdotto russo South Strem è stato firmato nell'ultima missione all'estero di Dmitri Medvedev, prima della sua elezione a successore di Vladimir Putin. Ai primi di marzo la ciliegina sulla torta nuziale con l'ingresso sul mercato serbo di uno dei primi cinque istituti di credito della nuova Russia post sovietica, con un capitale da 1,2 miliardi di euro. A dimostrare che la politica non sempre si muove lentamente, nella prima settimana di marzo, l'Osezia del sud, filo russa, ha chiesto a segretario generale dell'Onu, Unione europea e Russia, di riconoscere la sua indipendenza dalla Georgia. Come avvenuto in Kosovo.

Se cerchi la Russia a Belgrado, non puoi evitarti il vicino Москва хотел, l'ormai centenario hotel Moskva, inaugurato nel 1906 e da allora mai più ristrutturato a fondo. Tre passi dalla Trg Republika sino a Terazie, sul finire del passeggio da turbamento. L'hotel Moskva è un luogo per amatori. Bar e pasticceria sempre colmi di belgradesi impegnati in lunghissime conversazioni, sale enormi, col contrasto di una reception da questura, sul fronte posteriore, con un nugolo di addetti dalla solerzia e cortesia del piantone di turno. Quando superi lo sbarramento, ti accolgono piani a doppia alzata, cinque sei metri al soffitto e camere a due piani, entrata-salottino con mobili d'epoca solo per l'età, ed una scala in legno che ti scricchiola sino alla zona letto e al bagno. L'idraulica è da modernità real-socialista, la vista stupenda, anche di notte, visto che le tende sulle enormi finestre sono inamovibili dai tempi di Tito. Al Moskva, anche se non pernotti ma sei un intenditore, devi andare al ristorante. Sino a ieri era al primo piano, con pianista d'epoca incorporato e cameriere con ai piedi le scarpe di pezza bianche allacciate sino alla caviglia, di rigoroso modello sovietico. Oggi trovi le “hostess”, interpretazione estetica della nuova democrazia, tutte selezionate tra il meglio del famoso passeggio e tutte con movenze da indossatrici. Recentemente hanno spostato il ristorante al più gradevole piano terra, sull'angolo, ma sua specialità da intenditori resta sempre la stessa, la tartare che ti viene confezionata con i suoi diversi arricchimenti di fronte gli occhi, da un capocameriere molto compreso nella sua opera d'arte gastronomica". (Da LIMES, continua su MEGACHIP)

Postato da: Fandorin a 14:21 | link | commenti |
politica, kosovo, russia, serbia, putin

giovedì, 24 aprile 2008
L'EUROPA, IL GAS E LA DEMOCRAZIA

“L’Asia centrale è una regione sempre più importante per l’Ue e noi possiamo unire i nostri sforzi in numerosi settori. La nuova strategia dell’Ue per l’Asia centrale porta già i suoi frutti: il dialogo e la cooperazione si sono intensificati in un vasto ventaglio di settori e nuovi progetti sono stati avviati per promuovere lo sviluppo commerciale, l’educazione e lo Stato di diritto. Nel corso delle nostre riunioni, passeremo in rassegna tutti i settori, dal commercio ai diritti umani, passando dalle questioni internazionali che riguardano tanto l’Ue che l’Asia centrale, come l’evoluzione della situazione nel vicino Afghanistan e la lotta contro il traffico di stupefacenti”, parole di Benita Ferrero Wladner, commissario europeo per le Relazioni con l’estero in visita la settimana scorsa ad Asghabad, capitale del Turkmenistan.

Fino a poco tempo fa nessuno a Bruxelles si era preso la briga di occuparsi di Asia centrale. Sotto la spinta della Germania, che durante il semestre di presidenza nei primi sei mesi dello scorso anno ha avviato appunto quella che è stata denominata la nuova strategia della Ue, le cose sono cambiate. Naturalmente, oltre ai problemi caldi relativi all’Afghanistan (terrorismo e traffico di droga), il tema principale è quello energetico la relativa differenziazione delle vie di trasporto. Ecco perché in Turkmenistan, in sostanza ancora una dittatura dopo la sua indipendenza dall’Unione Sovietica nel 1991, i rappresentanti europei (con Ferrero Waldner sono arrivati il ministro degli Esteri sloveno Dmitry Rupel, l’inviato speciale Pierre Morel e il ministro degli Esteri francese Bernard Kouchner) si sono presentanti in grande stile e promettendo lauti finanziamenti (750 milioni di euro fino al 2013, con progetti specifici per tutti i Paesi). Sul tappeto, anche se appena accennata, la questione di un gasdotto che dal Caspio arrivi direttamente in Europa senza passare dalla Russia. Il progetto favorito dall’Unione sembra per ora trovare ostacoli insormontabili e non è ancora chiaro quale sorte avrà il Nabucco, la cui costruzione dovrebbe partire entro il 2010. L’Ue deve fare i conti con Mosca, ma anche con tutti i Paesi che sono interessati alle risorse energetiche della regione, Cina in primo luogo.

La visita in Turkmenistan è servita anche a fare il punto sulle relazioni tra Bruxelles e Tashkent: l’Uzbekistan, isolato e sanzionato dopo il massacro di Andijon (maggio 2005, centinaia di morti, roba da far impallidire l’ultima repressione cinese in Tibet), sembra aver trovato la strada della riconciliazione, con il presidente Islam Karimov arrivato senza nessun clamore al recente vertice Nato di Bucarest. “Ci sforziamo per una politica costruttiva, per avvicinare di nuovo l’Uzbekistan e per chiedere che si facciano passi in avanti verso la democrazia”, ha detto Benita Ferrero Waldner in un’intervista al servizio russo della Deutsche Welle. Prossimamente verrà aperto a Tashkent un ufficio della Commissione europea, proprio per facilitare il processo di dialogo. L’Uzbekistan, come il Turkmenistan non certo una democrazia in fieri ma una solida dittatura, cerca dunque un nuovo posizionamento, non del tutto appiattito su Mosca. A Bucarest Karimov ha addirittura proposto per l’Afghanistan una modifica della formula del 6+2 (i Paesi confinanti Cina, Iran, Pakistan, Tagikistan, Turkmenistan e Uzbekistan più Usa e Russia) in 6+3 con l’aggiunta della rappresentanza Nato. Come dire, veniamoci incontro, Andijon è lontana". (Ideazione)

Su GAZPROMNATION: Verso il Tapi?

Postato da: Fandorin a 12:08 | link | commenti (1) |
politica, europa, asia centrale

martedì, 22 aprile 2008
ACCENTRAMENTO

"Vladimir Putin is finishing the formation of a new political system, which won’t allow Dmitry Medvedev, his successor, to even attempt to act on his own. The incumbent President’s consent to become the leader of United Russia has been a key element in creating the new system. Vladimir Putin’s decision to become the leader of the United Russia Party starting with May 7 must have been the first serious political step of the second President of Russia which was announced in advance. It’s noteworthy that the members of United Russia and officials within the Kremlin Administration as well as the general public learned that Putin would head the party during the parliamentary elections as the decision was announced from the tribune at the United Russia pre-election congress. Spring, 2008 it is less important for Vladimir Putin to overwhelm people with extraordinary deeds than once again assert that everything goes according to his plan and it’s he who keeps a grip on power, not Dmitry Medvedev. As Putin moved into the Kremlin December, 1999, he didn’t have more political power than Dmitry Medvedev, elected President March, 2008. Eight years ago as well as at present the head of state assuming his office was far from being the most influential politician in the country, unable to boast anything except for a high approval rating.

By the beginning of 2000 a group of state officials and financiers (known as Semya – the Family) led by the Head of the Russian Presidential Administration Alexander Voloshin had shaped the policy of Russia. Not only was Vladimir Putin to appoint Voloshin the Head of his Administration, he also had to take account of his opinion when taking almost all critical decisions. Besides Vladimir Putin had to keep in his team such politicians as Russian Railways Minister Nikolay Aksenenko, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and EMERCOM (Ministry for the Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Disaster Relief) Minister Sergey Shoygu, who Semya considered possible successors to Boris Yeltsin. As successor to Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin had at least to seem committed to the political line of the First Russian President. 2008 Russia’s policy is determined by a group of managers and CEOs of state corporations headed by Vladimir Putin. Dmitry Medvedev will have to appoint him Prime Minister and take account of his opinion when arriving at all critical decisions. During his work visits, Dmitry Medvedev will have to regularly meet with those who could have become the United Russia presidential nominee. After all, the new president will have to base his policy on the 2020 Strategy, or Putin’s plan. The only difference between Vladimir Putin 2000 and Dmitry Medvedev 2008 lies in the fact that from the very outset, the former had the opportunity to make seemingly marginal appointments. At first they gave way to a series of jokes about “those from St.-Petersburg,” and as time went by, those people formed the mainstay of the notorious vertical of power". (continua su Kommersant)

"Il capo di Stato e futuro primo ministro (il 7 maggio gli subentrerà al Cremlino Dmitry Medvedev) avrá secondo Vedemosti il peso maggiore nel nuovo insolito tandem che guiderà prossimamente la Russia. Russia unita è in grado di bloccare alla Duma le proposte di legge del presidente (con 315 deputati si aggira tranquillamente il veto presidenziale) e le assemblee regionali possono evitare le nomine di nuovi governatori proposti dal Cremlino. Oltretutto, se in futuro a Medvedev saltasse in mente di cambiare premier, è facile intuire che con questa situazione parlamentare non verrebbe accettato nessun altro candidato. Della stessa opinione è Radio Free Europe, alle spalle un glorioso passato nella propaganda antisovietica, che cita Lilia Shevtsova del Carnegie Center di Mosca e Stanislav Belkovsky, analista prima vicino alla presidenza, ora tenuto a distanza per la sua apparente inaffidabilità. Per entrambi in ogni caso Putin vuole rafforzare la sua posizione anche come premier, per evitare inconvenienti e preparasi la strada del futuro al di fuori del Cremlino.

Per Vremia Novostei la nuova costellazione Putin-Medvedev non è priva di insidie e potrebbe condurre a conflitti tra i vari gruppi di potere. Il giornale riporta le parole di Dmitry Oreshkin, capo analista del gruppo Mercator, secondo il quale il futuro primo ministro Vladimir Putin e coloro che stanno dietro di lui hanno bisogno di un consolidamento di tutte le risorse amministrative per far sì che il successore Medvedev non abbia la possibilità nel futuro di alimentare una rivolta contro l’attuale elite dirigente. Per Smartmoney Putin a capo del governo russo, assumerà un ruolo di peso mai assunto da altri premier, soprattutto per quel riguarda il controllo sulle regioni, alcune delle quali verranno fuse per facilitarne il controllo e la gestione". (da TransEuropaPress-Ideazione)

Postato da: Fandorin a 09:56 | link | commenti |
politica, russia, putin, medvedev, silogarchi

venerdì, 18 aprile 2008
TETTE E GAS

"Primo incontro tra premier designati. E magari tra futuri presidenti, potrebbero dire cremlinologi e quirinalisti in vena di esagerazioni: uno vorrebbe subito ritornare al Cremlino, dove ha parcheggiato pro tempore un giovanotto di belle speranze; l’altro vorrebbe concludere la sua mirabolante carriera giunta oggi al penultimo capitolo, concludendo l’ultimo, domani, al Colle. Quelli che stanno con i piedi per terra si limitano a sottolineare che tra Vladimir Putin e Silvio Berlusconi corrono buoni rapporti personali in una cornice che vede tra Russia e Italia ottime relazioni bilaterali. Certo, il fattore spettacolare di incontri in Sardegna tra aerei che vanno lunghi in pista e ballerine scosciate del Bagaglino è pari solo alle slittate tra i boschi russi con l’ex cancelliere tedesco Gerhard Schröder, ma Vladimir Putin è un pragmatico che guarda al sodo. Dopo il solido asse Mosca-Berlino c’è da mettere in piedi qualcos’altro, con Berlusconi che si offre addirittura da traghettatore per il miglioramento delle relazioni tra Russia e Usa. Ma in sostanza a Villa Certosa il presidente russo di ritorno da Tripoli non c’è andato solo per fare i complimenti all’amico Silvio e a discettare di presunte conquiste amorose, quanto perché sul piatto del dialogo russo-italiano molto passa attraverso la questione del gas e gli accordi Gazprom-Eni in primo luogo. Segnali di un’alleanza che si basa su solidi rapporti tra grandi gruppi in forte espansione, con l’incontro tra i due primi ministri che entreranno in carica tra qualche settimana che è solo una conferma di quanto avvenuto finora con altri attori.

Giá un paio di settimane fa Putin, aveva accolto una delegazione di manager italiani nella sua residenza di Novo Ogarevo, vicino a Mosca, dimostrandosi più che ottimista per quel riguarda le relazioni e gli scambi commerciali tra i due Paesi. “Noi stiamo lavorando bene e in futuro andrà ancora meglio: ne sono convinto”, aveva detto allora il capo di Stato davanti a Paolo Scaroni, amministratore delegato di Eni, Giovanni Bazoli per Banca Intesa e Fulvio Conti, numero uno di Enel. ll leader del Cremlino non aveva perso occasione di sottolineare che l'Italia è uno dei partner più affidabili e promettenti e che in Russia la strategia è quella di portare avanti una politica di agevolazioni e ampliamento dell'attività degli investitori stranieri. Anche il passaggio di testimone tra Putin e Medvedev, considerato per le questioni economiche un liberale filoccidentale, non può che essere un motivo di ottimismo per tutti coloro, che in Italia ma non solo, sono interessati a investire nella ex Unione Sovietica.

Per l’Istituto italiano per il commercio estero, secondo i dati statistici forniti dal Comitato statale delle dogane russo sul commercio con i Paesi extra Csi, l’Italia rappresenta il secondo Paese partner di destinazione dell’export della Russia (principalmente materie prime energetiche: petrolio, gas e carbone) ed il settimo Paese di origine delle importazioni. Nel 2007 l’interscambio commerciale tra l’Italia e la Federazione Russa ammontava a circa 23,9 miliardi di euro, con un aumento rispetto al 2006 di circa il 12,8 per cento. La crescita dell’interscambio è stata trascinata sia dall’aumento delle importazioni italiane passate da 13,59 a 14,35 miliardi di Euro (+ 5,6 per cento) che da quello, più sostenuto, delle esportazioni dall’Italia passate da 7,62 a 9,57 miliardi di Euro (+25,6 per cento).Il saldo commerciale negativo dell’Italia é passato, quindi, da 5,96 a 4,77 miliardi di euro". (Ideazione)

Altri: RussiaToday, Repubblica, Corriere

Postato da: Fandorin a 12:51 | link | commenti (3) |
italia, politica, russia, putin

mercoledì, 16 aprile 2008
UNLIMITED POWER

"President Putin’s election to the position of chairman of the United Russia party creates an entirely new balance of power in Russia, where the president and members of the government were not part of any party since 1991. According to the changes introduced in United Russia’s statute on the eve of Putin’s election, the chairman will have virtually unlimited powers inside the party. He will be able to name candidates for all important positions inside United Russia’s top bodies, and to veto any decisions except the decisions of the party’s conventions. A chairman can be removed only by a two thirds majority vote at the party’s convention. Thus, as chairman of United Russia, Putin will in fact have personal control over the parliament, since United Russia has an absolute majority in the Duma, having received 64 percent of the vote during parliamentary elections in December 2007.

“The roots of the system, which was finally broken today, go back to 1991, when Boris Yeltsin was elected president of Russia, still a part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union,” said Alexei Makarkin, Vice President of the Moscow-based Center for Political Technologies (CPT) think tank. “At the time, Yeltsin’s main enemy was the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). So, Yeltsin then passed the so called de-partization decree, which banned parties from creating their cells inside government bodies or state-owned enterprises. The decree was aimed against CPSU, which had such cells almost everywhere. After the CPSU’s collapse, this system remained during the 1990s and most of the 2000s.” Originally aimed at reducing the role of the communists, de-partization began hampering the development of a multiparty system in Russia, preventing the formation of party-based governments and minimizing the role of parties in politics in general.

“Until now, a party in Russia, even if it won a lot of seats in the Duma, had no chance of influencing the real government policy,” said Gennady Gudkov, one of the leaders of the Just Russia party, the smallest of the four parties represented in the State Duma. “There were no governments based on party principle, no government coalitions and, in the last few years, no parliamentary investigations. Having such a strong figure as Putin at the head of a parliamentary party can increase the importance of parties as an institution.” Formally, Putin will acquire the powers of the chairman beginning May 7, when his successor Dmitry Medvedev is sworn into office, and he officially steps down from his position as president. However, while being the party’s chairman, Putin will not formally be its member. “In a way, this fact reflects a very important reality,” said Sergei Brilyov, a former television anchor and a member of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), an NGO uniting Russia’s top experts on political and defense issues. “The relation between parties and top government figures in Russia is the opposite of what it is in Western Europe. There, a party wins elections and puts its leader into the government. In Russia, it is the president or some important government official who creates a party. Putin, a popular president, was the creator of United Russia and not vice versa.”

CPT’s Alexei Makarkin noted that when during the 1990s Russia’s “party of power” was Our Home is Russia, a party created by the then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, the latter was formally not a party member neither. “It is a paradox, but in Russia government officials do not like to head the parties they create themselves,” Makarkin said. While unanimously voting Putin into chairmanship on Tuesday, United Russia’s convention strived to create an image of itself as “a party of all the people,” where discussions are possible and just about every current of political thought is represented. On the first day of the convention, the three most important United Russia’s discussion clubs held their meetings, marking three different groups inside the party, although UR’s members carefully avoided calling these groups “factions.” The first club, the Center for Social-Conservative Policy (CSCP) is informally headed by Andrei Isayev, the chairman of the Duma committee on labor and social policy. The club prides itself on being United Russia’s “brain center,” especially on social issues. The second club, November 4, is informally called a liberal one, since it concentrates its discussions on issues of political freedoms and the rights of an individual. The third club, tentatively called a “State-Patriotic” one, is supposed to unite moderate nationalists.

It is worth noting that discussions at United Russia’s convention were preceded by a two-day- long assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) in the Lesnye Dali resort near Moscow. There, some of the leading United Russia figures shared their views with representatives of Russia’s expert community. Since discussions at United Russia’s convention were largely closed to the press, SVOP’s assembly was a rare opportunity to glimpse United Russia’s plans and hear the assessment of their feasibility. Some of these assessments, made by SVOP’s members, were indeed critical. For example, commenting on United Russia’s plans to make Russia one of the five leading economies of the world by 2020, Sergei Vasilyev, a SVOP member and deputy chairman of Vneshekonombank, said that in 2015-2020, Russia will be producing about 3 percent of the world’s GDP, while housing about 2 percent of the world’s population. In Vasilyev’s opinion, the three leading economies of the world will keep producing 60 percent of the world’s GDP in 2015-2020. However, the names of these top three will change, as they will certainly include China, and, in a later period, probably India. The current leaders - the United States, the EU and Japan – will retain the leading positions in the world economy too. So, getting into the “big five” will be a problem for Russia. The same critical mood persisted during SVOP’s discussions of foreign policy, where United Russia member and the chairman of the Duma committee on foreign affairs Konstantin Kosachev urged the government to concentrate on winning over public opinion of prospective NATO members Ukraine and Georgia, instead of alienating these countries’ population by threats to retarget Russia’s nuclear missiles at them. Judging by SVOP’s assembly, discussions in United Russia will continue – but under a new chairman with virtually unlimited powers". (RussiaProfile)

Altri: Rian, Jamestown, Rferl, MoscowTimes, Kommersant

Postato da: Fandorin a 16:38 | link | commenti (3) |
politica, russia, putin

martedì, 08 aprile 2008
AND THE WINNER IS...

Dopo gli incontri a Bucarest a Soci si sono sprecati i commenti e le analisi su chi sia stato il vincitore.

La Russia che con il sostegno di Germania e Francia ha congelato il Map per Georgia e Ucraina? Putin, furbetto come al solito - la maschera cordiale in pubblico, quella nervosetta in privato - che consapevole di non poter allargare la Sco a Tbilisi e Kiev ha accettato lo stallo?

Gli Usa, che nonostante il blocco, hanno incassato consensi ed aiuti su scudo e Afganistan? Bush, che sparando alto nonostante sapesse benissimo che Merkel e Sarkozy non avrebbero tolto il veto, alla fine ha speso sorrisi e ottimismo?

Georgia e Ucraina, che anche se dovranno aspettare saranno comunque accolte a braccia aperte? Yanukovich, che da Donezk prepara il suo bel referendum anti Nato?

Maurizio Molinari su La Stampa sostiene che Bush ha vinto: "La Nato sposa il progetto americano di difesa antimissile, ottiene dai partner il rafforzamento delle truppe in Afghanistan e da Parigi la promessa del rientro nella struttura militare: grazie a questi tre risultati George W. Bush, chiude da vincitore il suo ultimo summit, iniziato in salita per il mancato consenso all’inizio del processo di adesione di Ucraina e Georgia...Il testo della «Dichiarazione di Bucarest» consente infine a Bush di non sentirsi del tutto sconfitto su Georgia e Ucraina perché il punto 23 recita: «Siamo concordi sul fatto che entreranno». Insomma, prima o poi avverrà".

Piero Sinatti su Ilsole24ore  parla di vittoria di misura per la Russia: "Vladimir Putin ha più di un motivo per essere soddisfatto degli esiti del summit di Bucarest e della sessione del Consiglio Russia NATO tenutasi nella sua giornata conclusiva. Si è ripreso se non rilanciato un dialogo, che da tempo pareva interrotto, pericolosamente. Soprattutto il presidente uscente russo non può non aver accolto con soddisfazione il rinvio a dicembre della decisione sull'entrata di Georgia e Ucraina nella NATO, fortemente da lui avversata , ma altrettanto fortemente sostenuta dal presidente Bush. Il quale, a Bucarest, ha chiesto con forza ai colleghi europei di accordare subito a Kiev e a Tbilisi il MAP ovvero Piano d'azione della membership per entrare nell'Alleanza entro quattro anni".

Evgeni Primakov su